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NOTE
Illuminating the Law of Copyright:
Holographic Data Storage Takes




Imagine for a moment a futuristic society in which a vast
amount of information is stored on a crystal block no larger than a
quarter. In this world, individual "CD's," videocassette tapes, and
digitalized computer disks have become obsolete. Instead, they
have been consolidated in single data storage systems which allow
the user lightening fast access to view any movie, listen to any re-
cording, or use a desktop computer to browse through the amount
of data contained in a typical law library. How far into the future
have we traveled? The surprising answer may be not far at all.'
As we are all well aware, the "Information Age" is upon us.
Everyone from Big Business to your fifth grade neighbor2 is "on-
line"3 and able to download data from the global communications
* J.D. Candidate 1999, Fordham University School of Law. The author greatly
appreciates her friends and family for their understanding and support throughout this
endeavor.
1. This scenario exaggerates the anticipated recording capacity of the first holo-
graphic data storage systems. In light of the ceaseless quest for technological improve-
ment, however, this depiction is not a dramatic departure from the realistic capabilities
which improvements upon this recording medium may enable. See Mark Halper, Putting
Mount Everest Into An Anthill, FORBES, July 7, 1997, at 208.
2. In 1994, a fifth grade class in Grand River, Michigan became the first elementary
school with a website on the Internet. See DAVID PEAL, THE OFFICIAL AMERICA ON-LINE
INTERNET GUIDE 3 (1997).
3. Approximately sixty million people presently use the Internet. See id., at xvii.
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network known as the "Internet."4 Today's rush to gather and rec-
ord information5 will inevitably lead to the development of the data
storage technologies of tomorrow as digitalized storage mediums
become ill equipped to handle the volume and speeds which larger
and more complex computing applications will r . 6and orecomlexcomutig a n require. Digital-
ized storage systems are "'bit-based' in that they have a drive head
that scans media to read linear rows of data."7 The problem with
this medium is that "there are only so many bits that can fit onto a
disk before the bits become magnetically unstable."' Experts pre-
dict that at the rate at which information is being digitalized, this
limit9 will be reached within ten years.'
Some researchers hail the perfection of holographic data stor-
age as the solution to this dilemma." This recording medium, 2
which offers an almost inconceivable amount of storage capacity
and the ability to access data at incredible speeds may, if refined,
present the next great leap in information technology. 3 Presently,
the United States Department of Defense, 4 NASA, 5 a consortium
4. "The Internet today is a worldwide entity whose nature cannot be easily or simply
defined. From a technical definition, the Internet is the 'set of all interconnected IP net-
works'-the collection of several thousand local, regional, and global computer networks
interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP Internetworking Protocol suite ..." Religious
Tech. Center v. Netcom On-line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2 (N.D.Cal
1995) (quoting DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994)).
5. "The Internet is stimulating the urge to store and retrieve all sorts of information
in digital form." Halper, supra note 1, at 208.
6. See Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, OPTICAL MEMORY NEWS, Aug. 12, 1997.
7. Id.
8. Halper, supra note 1, at 208.
9. This scientific principle is known as the "superparamagnetic limit." See David
M. Stone, Future Mass Storage, P.C. MAGAZINE, Mar. 25, 1997, at 182.
10. Today's most densely packed disks hold approximately 2.6 gigabytes to the
square inch. Instability will likely occur when disks are asked to hold 50 - 100 gigabytes
per square inch; a volume which will probably be reached by the next decade. See Hal-
per, supra note 1, at 208.
11. See Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6.
12. Holography was invented by Dennis Gabor in 1947. The Hungarian-born engi-
neer won the 1971 Nobel Prize in physics for this work. See Holography, in WORLD
BOOK MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1997). Recent advancements in this technology have
significantly increased its utility. See Drew Winter, Holography Hits A Roadblock:
Automakers Need A Technological Breakthrough From Silicon Valley, WARDS AUTO
WORLD, June 1997, at 3.
13. See Winter, supra note 12, at 3.
14. The Defense Department has spent twenty-five million dollars to advance re-
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of Universities and at least a dozen corporate researchers including
IBM, Kodak, Lucent Technologies, and Japan's NTT, 6 are work-
ing on the development of holographic storage.17
This Note argues that some properties of holographic data stor-
age systems should receive copyright protection while other as-
pects of this technology are ineligible. Part I examines holo-
graphic data storage systems and the history and development of
copyright law. Part H discusses the judiciary's treatment of copy-
right issues in cases which present similar technological advance-
ments. Part IH argues that holographic computer programs will be
copyrightable, as will other works fixed in this medium. This Note
concludes that the copyright laws as they presently exist are broad
enough to encompass the advent of holographic technology.
I. HOLOGRAPHIC DATA SYSTEMS AND THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Two hundred years ago, the founding fathers wove intellectual
property protection into the fabric of the United States Constitu-
tion. The United States was the first country to do so.' 9 With the
Copyright and Patent Clause as a guide, this country has "grown
from a small, agrarian country into an economic powerhouse-the
world's leading creator and exporter of scientific know-how and
popular culture."20
As new technologies develop, intellectual property2' laws must
be interpreted or reformatted to incorporate elements not previ-
ously considered. This Part explains the holographic data storage
process and discusses the evolution of federal copyright law. First,
search in this area. See Halper, supra note 1, at 208.
15. See Light Sensing Technologies Hurdle Barriers, INTECH, Mar. 1997, at 28.
16. See Holographics, FORBES, July 7, 1997, at 210.
17. See Holograms Promise Vast Storage Capacity, supra note 6.
18. See Ralph Oman, Copyright And Software: The Emerging International Con-
sensus, 67-Jun N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (1995).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. "Intellectual property is the legal regime by which authors and inventors protect
intellectual creations." Tara Goldsmith, Comment, What's Wrong With This Picture?
When The Lanham Act Clashes With Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 826 (1997).
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this Part presents the scientific methods used to accomplish holo-
graphic storage and the advantages of this technology. Next, the
history, objectives, and protections afforded by copyright law are
considered. Finally, this Part focuses upon the criteria for estab-
lishing copyright infringement claims and defenses to this cause of
action.
A. Holographic Data Systems-The Wave of the Future
Holographic data storage technology is uniquely qualified to
fulfill the constant quest to fit more data into a smaller space, . It
uses a process called "multiplexing,"23 or "overlapping storage' 24 to
increase volume capacity without increasing the size of the storage
container.25 Experts estimate that holographic memory could store
"one hundred bits26 per square micro[n] whereas current magnetic
,,2172disks can only contain approximately three bits in that space.
The data transfer rate is also significantly increased using this
technology.
Holographic storage is accomplished by using two converging
lasers to record data" within the cubic volume of a crystal.'
22. The demand for larger capabilities in a smaller space has long been a theme in
the computer industry. In 1956 IBM's first magnetic hard drive computer was so large
that it had to be delivered on a flat bed truck. It held only 5 megabytes of memory and
used fifty 24 inch disks. By the 1980's personal computers had significantly shrunken in
size but held twice as much memory. Today, the average home computer's 2 gigabyte
drive uses two, 3.5 inch disks. See Halper, supra note 1, at 208.
23. See Holograms Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6; see also, discussion of
multiplexing infra note 34.
24. See Toshiba Material Becomes High-Density Memory, COMLINE ELECTRONICS,
Aug. 6, 1997.
25. See id.
26. A bit is a binary digit, the smallest unit of information that a computer can rec-
ognize, represented by a single 0 or 1. A group of eight bits is a byte. See E.D. Hirsch,
Jr., ed. DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (2d ed. 1993).
27. See Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6. A micron is a unit of
length equal to one millionth of a meter. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY
DICTIONARY, 749 (Riverside Publ'g Co. 1994).
28. Toshiba predicts that its development of new "photo-refractive material" will
allow 50 terabytes per square centimeter to be recorded. See Toshiba Material Becomes
High Density Memory, supra note 24.
29. "Holographic devices can transfer data at 1GB/SEC where current devices
measure rates in 100's of MB/SEC." Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6.
30. Holographic storage is achieved by a process whereby electronic bits of data are
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Through multiplexing, multiple "pages" of data are recorded in
virtually the same area of crystal.32 This process enables a com-
puter to optically read and write data at the same time, thus facili-
tating "high volume access that would be impossible by [current]
electronic means."33  Multiplexing is actually a simple concept
which is illustrated by the typical hologram with which most peo-
ple are familiar.34  Traditional holographic images of three-
dimensional objects are activated by changing the angle of light
shining on the image which results in the production of a different
view of the object.35 Holographic data storage functions in essen-
downloaded from a computer and assembled in a spatial light modulator, which is basi-
cally a liquid crystal display screen, or LCD. A laser is then beamed at this. The light
reflecting off the LCD is intersected by a second laser, or reference beam. The intersec-
tion of the two beams creates an interference pattern which is recorded within the crystal
as a pattern of dark and light patches. The information is recalled by directing the refer-
ence beam through the crystal at the same angle at which it was recorded and focusing
that beam on a camera which restores the images to electronic bits of data. See id.; see
also technological discussion of holographic data storage infra notes 308 and 312.
31. Digital technologies store data within the flat surface of a disk. See
Holographics, supra note 16, at 210.
32. See Holograms Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6.
33. Chappell Brown, Ambitious Academics Aim to Integrate Cyrogenic Processors,
Optical Interconnectors and Holographic Storage-Researchers Pursue the Petaflops
Computer, ELEcTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 1.
34. See Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6; see also D.F. Scott, Light
Waves Ahead, COMPUTER SHOPPER, May 1996, at 562 (discussing holography's potential
to be more than "a sparkly 3-d sticker" affixed to the packaging of The Lion King CD).
Typical holography employs photographic plates or other light-sensitive material to store
and display three dimensional images. A hologram is created when the plate is exposed
to light. Most people are familiar with the basic hologram's use as a security device on
some credit cards. This type of hologram is also a common sight in advertising, artwork,
and jewelry. See Winter, supra note 12, at 3.
35. See Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6. Basic holography in-
volves two steps:
(1) Creating a hologram and (2) Illuminating the hologram to display the im-
age. During the first step a laser light is reflected off a subject and onto a light-
sensitive material, such as a photographic plate. Another laser beam, called the
reference beam, also shines on the plate. Where these two light beams cross on
the plate, they make a complex microscopic pattern of bright and dark stripes.
In the second step, a light beam traveling in the same direction as did the refer-
ence beam illuminates the hologram. The hologram changes the direction of
light waves in this beam so that waves appear to come from the original illumi-
nated subject. The resulting three-dimensional image seems to hover in space.
Illuminating the hologram with white light, such as sunlight, produces an image
containing rainbow like bands of color. Using a beam of a single color, such as
19981
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tially the same manner, "except new angles reveal entirely new
pages of data. 36 The potential uses for holographic storage are
numerous. 3 The utilities of such a system could include the crea-
tion of high-speed digital libraries , enhancement of satellite
communications39 , product design technology 0 , and military capa-
bilities4 , as well as the advancement of new applications such as
"telemedicine."
42
A hybrid digital/holographic work illustrates the potential pub-
lic utilities of holographic storage mediums.43 The development of
an interactive holographic work which also uses digital technology
has enabled a simulation of the human body to be reproduced in
three dimensional form.44 This representation can be manipulated
in mid-air, and has been tested by physicians as a new advance in
medicine. 45 By employing this "telemedical" instrument, doctors
46
are able to learn more about the body without using a live person.
These results have thrilled doctors and clearly depict the substan-
tial enhancements in the quality of life which could be provided by
such hybrid mediums, as well as purely holographic mediums. 47
a laser beam, avoids this effect.
Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6.
36. Id.
37. See Electronics and Optics, INDUSTRIES IN TRANSITION, June 1997.
38. See Holographs Promise Vast Capacity, supra note 6.
39. Id.
40. See Victor D. Chase, Using Holography To Design In Thin Air, APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURER, Aug. 1, 1997, at 8.
41. See id.; see also Electronics and Optics, supra note 37.
42. See Physicians Report That Digital Holography Aids Diagnosis And Treatment
Of Complex Spinal and Head and Neck Conditions, BUSINESS WIRE, May 1997, available
in Westlaw, BUSWIRE database.
43. See Lambertus Heselink, Digital Holographic Storage Looks Ahead, PHOTONICS
SPECTRA, Mar. 1, 1996, at 44.
44. See Sami Menefee, Digital Holographic Tool Gives Surgeons Life-size Images,
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B. Copyright Law - History and Development
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies., 48 This Constitutional provision delegates broad authority to
Congress to enact legislation to protect creative works. From this
enumerated right federal copyright law49 has developed.0
1. Historical Development
a. Copyright Objectives
Copyright law is grounded in the First Amendment's basic
premise that access to freely disseminated information and ideas is
fundamental to the public welfare." The Copyright Clause52 in the
Constitution endows Congress with vast discretionary power to
regulate the law of copyright in furtherance of progress.5 This
power derives from an economic theory of societal development 4
The theory posits that monetary incentives stimulate the creation of
original works which ultimately advance the technological, eco-
nomic, and artistic development of society. The establishment of
legally protectable rights in original creations secures a fair return
for the individual's labor while inevitably benefiting the masses. 6
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. Patent law also traces its origins to this provision of the Constitution. See Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). "A patent is a grant from the
government to the patentee of a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
claimed invention in the United States for a period of time." David Bender, Patents and
Software, N.Y. ST. B.J. May/June 1995.
50. See Julian Velasco, Note, The Copyrightability of Non-Literal Elements Of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 248-249 (1994).
51. See id.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8,,cl. 8 is also known as the Copyright Clause.
53. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 41-47 (D.
Mass 1990) (holding menu structure of as.spreadsheet is copyrightable).
54. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954) (holding that utilitarian nature of
statuette lamps did not invalidate copyright as 'works of art').
55. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
56. See id.
1998]
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In a landmark copyright case, the Second Circuit stated, "[t]he in-
terest of the copyright law is not in simply conferring a monopoly
on industrious persons, but in advancing the public welfare through
rewarding artistic creativity, in a manner that permits the free use
and development of non-protectable ideas and processes."57 Con-
gress is charged with the task of maintaining a delicate balance
between enacting laws which encourage development, and limiting
the extent of those laws to avoid the effects of "monopolistic stag-
nation.""8 The Supreme Court has stated emphatically that "the
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors."59 Rather, the Court has indicated that one of the most
important policies of copyright law is the dissemination of creative
material to the public. 60
b. Technology Compels Change
The law of copyright has, from its beginning, developed in re-
sponse to significant changes in technology. 61 "Copyright protec-
tion became necessary with the invention of the printing press62 and
had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. 6 3 Copy-
57. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Atlai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that nonliteral elements of a rewritten computer program were not substantially
similar to copyrighted work).
58. See Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156.
59. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d at 711.
60. The Court stated:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest. Creative work is to be encouraged and re-
warded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music and other arts. The immediate ef-
fect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative la-
bor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good ....
Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 442 U.S. at 15.).
61. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (holding that videotaped recordings of public television programming was a fair
use).
62. With the invention of the printing press, copies of printed works could easily be
disseminated without the author's permission or financial reward. See William C. War-
ren, Foreword to BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967).
63. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d
1471, 1479n.14 (llth Cir. 1991), vacateden banc, 949 F.3d 378 (llth Cir. 1991).
[Vol.9:361
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right, however, cannot be sustained as a right that existed at com-
mon law, but depends wholly on Congressional legislation. 64 Con-
gress may use its judgment, within Constitutional limits, to deter-
mine the scope of the works protected, length of time the copyright
holder is afforded rights, and the remedies which may be sought
for copyright infringement.6 ' The First Congress, in 1790, used its
authority to extend copyright protection to "any map, chart, book,
or books already printed. 66 Subsequent amendments to this legis-
lation delineated other specific mediums which were deemed copy-
right protected.67 Congress attempted to end this type of piecemeal
augmentation of the law by creating a broad category of protected
works in the Copyright Act of 1909.68 Nonetheless, the persistent
infusion of new technologies which expand the range of mediums
in which an author might express an original "writing ' 69 prompted
Congress, in 1976, to enact a major revision of copyright law
which was more receptive to technological advances.7° This statute
and its amendments comprise the current federal copyright laws.7'
64. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954) (finding that no authority exists
for obtaining copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized it).
65. See id. At common law, authors had some intellectual property rights in unpub-
lished works, but copyright protection as it exists today was created by federal statute.
66. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 47 (D. Mass
1990) (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831)).
67. See id. at 52. Designs, prints, etchings, and engravings were added in 1802;
musical compositions in 1831; dramatic compositions in 1856; photographs and the
negatives thereof in 1865; and statutory and models or designs intended to be perfected as
works of the fine arts in 1870. Id.
68. The Copyright Act of March 4, 1909 provided: "the works for which copyright
may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author." Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch.320 § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at 17 USC § 4, reprinted in 17
U.S.C.A. App § 4 (West Supp. 1990); recodifed 1947; repealed 1976.). This act pro-
vided a list of examples of copyrighted works but did not limit copyright protection to
those works. See id. at § 5.
69. The term writing has been broadly interpreted. See Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967).
70. See Lotus v. Paperback, 740 F.Supp. at 47.
71. An important addition to the Copyright Act of 1976 is the incorporation of the
Beme Convention in 1988. This amendment provided that the U.S. would adhere to cer-
tain international copyright laws which were signed at Berne, Switzerland in 1866. See
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
1998]
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c. Copyrightable Works
The Copyright Act of 197672 provided that: "copyright protec-
tion subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."73 The
act included a list of categories74 which was intended to be "illus-
trative and not limitative" of protected works which are copy-
rightable.75 Copyright infringement cases often turn on whether the
allegedly copied work is, itself, entitled to legal protection.76 Con-
gress explicitly denied copyright protection to "any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied.,
77
Copyright protection is thus afforded only to "those aspects of
[a] work termed 'expression'... that display the stamp of the
author's originality."78 Although creativity is required in forming
an idea, it is a fundamental principle of copyright law that ideas are
not copyrightable. 79 The Constitutional aim of promoting progress
is inherently rebuffed where access to ideas is restricted by laws
which permit an idea's originator to prohibit others from its utili-
72. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1010) (West Supp. 1999)).
73. 17 U.S.C. A. § 102(b) (West Supp. 1999).
74. Works of authorship include: (1) literary works, (2) musical works including
any accompanying words, (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, (6)
motion pictures and other audio visual works, and (7) sound recordings. 17 U.S.C.A. §
102(a) (l)-(7) (West Supp. 1999).
75. See H.R. REP. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
76. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that expression of a book-
keeping system was not copyrightable); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F.
Supp. 616 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that symbols used in Apple's computer icons were
unprotectable).
77. 17 U.S.C. A. § 102(b) (West Supp. 1999).
78. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350
(1991) (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)).
79. See generally baker, 101 U.S. at 103 (holding that the copyright of a book on
bookkeeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell and use account-books pre-
pared upon the plan set forth in such book).
[Vol.9:361
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zation.'s Thus, only the creative works which stem from ideas"1 are
the proper subjects of copyright law. 2
In practice, however, it is often unclear where the boundary
line is drawn between an idea and its expression. 3 In one case that
addressed the issue of copyright law and new technologies, the
Court stated that it is very difficult to discern the difference be-
tween an idea and an expression. 4 Judge Learned Hand once
noted that "[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when an
imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
'expression'. . . Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.""
"As a general matter and to varying degrees, copyright protec-
tion extends beyond a literary works' strictly textual form to its
non-literal components.8 16 Courts have protected non-literal com-
ponents where "the fundamental essence of one work is duplicated
in another."" Non-literal copying, where sufficiently extensive,
constitutes more than the taking of an idea; "it has always been
viewed as the copying of elements of an expression of creative
originality."8 In a case involving the copyrightability of a com-
puter spreadsheet program the court stated that, "[w]hen faced with
80. See Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1235 (3d Cir. 1986).
81. The principle that expressions are copyrightable while ideas are not is known as
the "idea-expression dichotomy." See Ian C. Ballon & Heather D. Rafter, Computer
Software Protection, 431 PLI/PAT 81, 81 (Mar. 1996).
82. Where ideas cannot be distinguished from their expression copyright is not af-
forded. Three limiting doctrines of copyright, "merger," "scenes a faire," and "useful
article" employ this notion. See Velasco, supra note 50, at 248-49.
83. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (employing
"Abstractions Test" to distinguish idea from expression).
84. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Atlai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that nonliteral elements of compatibility of rewritten computer program were
not substantially similar to copyrighted work). The Altai court stated: "Drawing the line
between idea and expression is a tricky business. Judge Learned Hand noted that
"[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can."' Id. at 704
(citing Nichols v. Universal, 45 F.2d at 121).
85. Id. at 704 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
86. Id. at 701.
87. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01, at
13-4 (1991).
88. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 51-52 (D. Mass
1990).
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nonliteral-copying cases, courts must determine whether similari-
ties are due merely to the fact that the two works share the same
underlying idea or whether they instead indicate that the second
author copied the first author's expression." 9
Further, copyrightable works often contain uncopyrightable
elements within them.9° For example, although copyright law af-
fords no protection to facts,9' compilations of such may sometimes
be copyrighted.9 "No person can claim original conception of
facts," 93 thus facts themselves are not copyrightable no matter how
much "sweat of the brow" 94 one has expended in gathering them.95
Nonetheless, where a compilation of facts is arranged in a manner
which is sufficient to constitute an original expression, the work as
a whole may receive copyright protection.96 The same holds true
for compilations of preexisting materials that is the work product
of others.97 A compilation's author receives no rights regarding the
preexisting materials and effects no change in copyrights. 9
d. Legal Rights
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that certain legal rights are
possessed by the holder of a copyright. 99 A copyright owner is af-
forded the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies, prepare
derivative works °°, distribute copies of the work to the public' °1,
89. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the menu command hierarchy for computer spreadsheet program was uncopy-
rightable method of operation).
90. See National Basketball Assoc. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir.
1997).
91. 17 U.S.C. A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
92. See Publications Int'l Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996).
93. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
94. "Sweat of the brow" is also known as "industrious collection." See Cable News
Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1480 (1 lth Cir.
1991), vacated en banc, 949 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1991).
95. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
350 (1991).
96. Id.
97. 17 U.S.C. A. § 103(b) (West Supp. 1999).
98. Id.
99. 17 U.S.C. A. § 106 (West Supp. 1999).
100. A derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works. See 17
U.S.C. A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
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and where applicable, to perform and display the work publicly.'02
Congress has legislated that a copyright in a work created on or
after January 1, 1978 subsists from its creation and generally en-
dures for the life of the author plus fifty years after the author's
death. 103 The statute also provides that anyone who violates any of




In a suit for copyright infringement the plaintiff must prove
two elements.' 6 First, the plaintiff must establish ownership of a
valid copyright.'O' This is established when the plaintiff demon-
strates both the "Copyrightability"' 8 of the work and compliance
with the statutory requirements in securing the copyright.' 9 A
registration certificate issued by the Copyright Office" is prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the information
contained in the certificates."' This presumption of copyrightabil-
101. Distribution may occur through sale or other transfer of ownership, rental,
lease, or loan. 17 U.S.C. A. § 106 (West Supp. 1999).
102. See id.
103. 17 U.S.C. A. § 302(a) (West Supp. 1999). Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) are
exceptions to the general rule and state their own terms of copyright endurance.
104. These exclusive rights are defined in 17 U.S.C. A. §§ 106-118 (West Supp.
1999).
105. 17 U.S.C. A. § 501(a) (West Supp. 1999).
106. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1977).
107. See id.
108. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
109. See Central Point Software, Inc. v. Nugent, 903 F.Supp. 1057, 1059 (E.D. Tex.
1995).
110. "One does not 'obtain' a copyright from the Copyright Office. A claimant
merely registers its claim of copyright in a work with the Copyright Office. Copyright
itself arises by operation of law when any original work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression from which it can be perceived." Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Moni-
toring Services of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1480 (1 lth Cir. 1991), vacated en banc, 949
F.3d 378 (1 1th Cir. 1991); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). "Registration, however, is a pre-
requisite to initiation of an action for infringement." Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at
1480.
111. 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(c) (West Supp. 1999).
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ity, however, is refutable by the defendant."2
Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant unlawfully
replicated the copyrighted work."3 Copying may be proven
through direct evidence." 4 For example, to prove copyright in-
fringement, a copyright holder may present a witness who saw the
copyrighted work being copied by the alleged infringer. Many
times, however, no such witnesses are available. Therefore, the
element of copying is often proven by demonstrating the substan-
tial similarity of the two works and defendant's access to the copy-
righted work."' Copying can also be established when the two
works are shown to be so "strikingly similar as to preclude the pos-
sibility of independent creation."
' 16
The courts most often employ the ordinary observer test to de-
termine whether two works are substantially similar."' This test
focuses on "whether the accused work is so similar to the plain-
tiffs work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that
the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs protectible
expression by taking material of substance and value.""...
The ordinary observer test, however, "which was developed in
cases involving novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not
permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in cases involving
computer programs on account of the programs' complexity and
unfamiliarity to most members of the public."'' 9 In such instances,
where "the subjects of the copyright are particularly complex,"
112. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1171, 1174
(N.D. Tex. 1997).
113. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1977).
114. See Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44,48 (2d Cir. 1986).
115. See id.
116. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1171, 1171 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (quoting Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
117. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiff who demon-
strated substantial similarity of two video game characters).
118. Id.
119. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1232 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that copyright extended past computer programs' literal
code to structure, sequence and organization).
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most courts employ "a single substantial similarity inquiry ac-
cording to which both lay and expert testimony... [are] admissi-
ble."
120
Substantial similarity cannot be determined through an exami-
nation of a set portion of the work. 2 ' The courts have held that
"quantitatively insignificant infringement may be substantial if the
material is qualitatively important to plaintiff's work." 122 In a case
holding that copyright protection extended past a computer pro-
gram's structure, sequence and organization, the court stated that it
must make a qualitative, not quantitative assessment of the work as
a whole when determining substantial similarity. 
2
1
Liability for direct infringement' 24 may be imposed without a
finding of intent to copy or knowledge of the infringement.121 "It is
settled that innocent intent is generally not a defense to copyright
infringement."' 26  However, "the issue of the defendant's intent
may affect the amount of statutory damages available to the plain-
120. Id. at 1233.
121. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 623-24 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that unprotectable elements of computer program were not virtually
identical to corresponding elements of allegedly infringing works).
122. Id. at 624.
123. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1245 (3d Cir. 1986).. The court stated:
There is no general requirement that most of each of two works be compared
before a court can conclude that they are substantially similar. In the cases of
literary works (e.g. novels, movies, or plays), it is often impossible to speak of
,most' of the work. Instead, the court must make a qualitative, not quantitative,
judgment about the character of the work as a whole and the importance of the
substantially similar portions of the work.
Id.
124. Contributory and vicarious infringement have also been addressed by the
courts. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907
F.Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
125. See 17 U.S.CA. § 504(c) (West Supp. 1999). Prior to the Berne Convention's
adoption in 1988, innocent intent was generally not a defense to copyright infringement,
as notice of copyright was required to appear on copyrighted works. Notice is not re-
quired under the Berne Convention. Therefore, innocent intent may be considered as a
mitigating factor in assessing statutory damage awards, while willful intent may result in
awarding the statutory maximum of $100,000 per infringement. See 17 U.S.C.A. §
504(c) (2) (West Supp. 1999).
126. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 878
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding that video game images were fixed, citing 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHTS 13.08 (1981)).
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tiff."'27 Congress has provided that a copyright infringer is liable
for the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional prof-
its of the infringer, or statutory damages as provided by federal
copyright law.8
Copyright infringement can be found even where there is no
literal2 9 copying if the "total concept and feel" of a copyrighted
work is duplicated in another. 30 "[S]light differences between a
protected work and an accused work will not preclude a finding of
infringement" where the works are substantially similar in other
respects. 3' Exact reproduction or near identity is not necessary to
establish infringement.. "[An infringement... includes also the
various modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted,
imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable




Independent creation is a complete defense to copyright in-
fringement. 33 The defendant must show that the plaintiff's original
work was not copied, but rather, it was a separately created origi-
nal work which bears resemblance to the plaintiff's. 34 This de-




128. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1999).
129. "[Copylright cannot be limited literally to text, else a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations." See Nichols v. Universal, 45 F.2d at 121.
130. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1234 (3d Cir. 1986). (citing Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
131. Atari v. Philips, 672 F.2d at 618.
132. Id. (quoting Universal Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354,
360 (9th Cir. 1947)).
133. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1227 n.7.
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b. Fair Use
Fair Use is another complete defense to copyright infringe-
ment. 36 This policy "permits and requires courts to avoid rigid ap-
plication of the copyright statute when on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity it was designed to foster." '37 Congress has four
non-exclusive factors which are relevant to a judicial finding of
fair use. 3' These are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, in-
cluding whether such is of a commercial nature;'(2) the nature of
the work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted
work.'39 Generally, this defense applies where a work is used "for
purposes such as criticism, comment news reporting, teaching,
scholarship or research."'
40
A court, in considering this affirmative defense, must use a
case by case analysis of the facts in light of the statutory and other
relevant factors. 4 ' The results of this comparison should then be
balanced against the objectives' 2 of copyright law.' 43 Fair use of a
copyrighted work should be found where the interest in the fur-
therance of progress outweighs the interest in prohibiting the in-
fringing usage.'"
c. Misuse of Copyright
Misuse of copyright is a defense which has its origins in patent
law. 45 In that realm, the Supreme Court held that a patent holder
could not use the grant of a patent to dictate the products which
136. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1999).
137. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stew-
art v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
138. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1999).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
142. See discussion of copyright objectives supra notes 51-60.
143. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
144. See id. at 570-71.
145. See Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.,488 (1942) (holding that scope
of patent was exceeded by license agreement which required salt tablets produced by
Morton Salt be used in conjunction with its patented salt depositing machine).
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could be used in conjunction with a patented invention.' 46 To allow
a patent holder to do so would in effect create a monopolization of
markets outside of the government's limited grant. 47 This theory
has been applied to copyright. 148 One court, comparing the com-
mon interests of copyright and patent law, espoused the application
of the misuse defense in copyright cases. 49  Thus, where an in-
fringer can prove that the copyright holder has exceeded his rights
in this manner, the infringing usage will not lead to liability. 50
II. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
"The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely
connected with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with
technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the
other."'' Each era draws a different balance among the interest of
the writer in the control and exploitation of his or her intellectual
property, the related interest of the publisher, and the competing
interest of society in the "untrammeled dissemination of ideas."'
52
This Part examines the effect technological improvements have
had on federal copyright law. Congressional reaction to such ad-
vances and the judiciary's application of federal statutes to new
146. See id. at 491.
147. See id.
148. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that defendant misused its copyright by including in its standard licensing
agreement clauses which prevent the licensee from participating in any manner in the
creation of computer assisted die-making software).
149. See id. at 976 (citing Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492). The court stated:
Since copyright and patent law serve parallel interests, a "misuse" defense
should apply to infringement actions brought to vindicate either right....
[T]he similarity of the policies underlying patent and copyright is great and
historically has been consistently recognized. Both patent law and copyright
law seek to increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding in-
ventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time.
At the same time, the granted monopoly power does not extend to property not
covered by the patent or copyright.
Id.
150. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972.
151. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of Am., Inc., 940
F.2d 1471, 1479n.14 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated en banc, 949 F.3d 378 (1lth Cir. 1991)
(quoting Benjamin Kaplan, supra note 62, at vii-viii).
152. Id.
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creative mediums are discussed herein. This section focuses upon
the court's treatment of copyright law in relation to computer tech-
nology.
A. Legislation and Lawsuits
Copyright law has been characterized by gradual expansion in
the types of works afforded protection as advancements in tech-
nology have been realized.'53 Congress and the courts have been
faced with reconciling copyright laws with the emergence of "new
techniques for capturing and communicating printed matter, visual
images, and recorded sound.' 54 The copyright issues presented by
the development of information storage and retrieval devices have
also sparked much debate. 5
1. Congressional Amendments
The Copyright Act of 1976 was designed to address a scientifi-
cally progressive society. 5 6 The statute's phrasing purposely ex-
tends copyright protection to "original works of authorship," rather
than to "writings" in anticipation of evolving mediums of expres-
sion which could fall under the scope of copyright law. 5 Further,
in an attempt to expand the statute's application to mediums not
yet in existence, the legislation required that the mode of expres-
sion in which a work is fixed be "now known or later devel-
oped." 59
Historically, new areas of federal protection were initiated by
Congress in response to the expansion of creative means which
were not within the scope of the federal copyright statute. 161
Among the mediums specifically provided copyright protection




156. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 48 (D.
Mass 1990).
157. See H.R. REP. 94-1476 § 102.
158. See Lotus v. Paperback, 740 F.Supp. at 48.
159. H.R. REP. 94-1476 § 102, under heading "Fixation in a Tangible Form."
160. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973).
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since 1865 are photographs and their negatives, motion pictures,
and sound recordings.' 61  Moreover, the Copyright Act of 1976
sought to include protection for "live" television and radio broad-
casts by adding a provision which deemed these works "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression"' 62 where the fixation of the work is
made simultaneously with its live transmission. 63
Subsequent amendments have also aided the development of
the law in response to new technology. One such change involves
the protection of copyrighted audio recordings against digital pi-
racy.' 6' The amended statute reflects Congressional recognition of
the threat posed by high quality reproductions enabled by digital
recording devices owned by individuals.
61
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works, ("CONTU"), was established by Congress in
1974 to study the impact of scientific advances on copyright law
and to make legislative recommendations. CONTU especially fo-
cused its attention on computer technology. 66 The 1980 Amend-
ments to the Copyright Act reflect Congressional enactment of
CONTU's findings.' 67 The amendments were few as CONTU con-
sidered copyright law to apply to computer programs without leg-
islative amendment.' 68  Congress' most significant modifications
were the adding of the definition of computer programs" , and
clarifying the legal rights of use and adaptation extended to rightful
possessor's of copies of computer programs.7 ° These amendments
provide that "[a] 'computer program' is a set of statements or in-
structions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order
161. See id. at 562 n.17.
162. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
163. See NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
164. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.)[hereinafter DPRA]. Section 1 of the DPRA amended sections 101, 106, 111,
114,115, 119, 801,802, and 803.
165. See id.
166. See Velasco, supra note 50, at 248-49.
167. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6506.
168. See Velasco, supra note 50, at 248-49.
169. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
170. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1999).
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to bring about a certain result."' 7' Further, the amendments clarify
the permissible uses of copyrighted computer programs by pro-
viding that "it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of another
copy or adaptation of that computer program when necessary to
"the utilization of the computer program" or "for archival purposes
only."'
7 2
2. The Role of the Courts
The 1980 Congressional amendments did not resolve many of
the difficult copyright issues which stem from the advent of com-
puter technology.' Congress, in response to progress, has often
enacted vague statutes which are intended to encompass new
modes of creativity. 74 Such legislation has many times failed to
definitively settle copyright issues centered around emerging tech-
nologies. Moreover, the advent of new technologies has some-
times made unclear the application of otherwise straightforward
statutes. 75 In these situations, the courts must interpret outdated
statutory language "in ... light of drastic technological change.
''
7
The Supreme Court has noted that "[w]hen technological
change has rendered [the] literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright
Act must be construed... [with regard to its] ... basic purpose."'
77
The development of television and radio has presented the judici-
ary with the task of adapting copyright law "to prevent the exploi-
tation of protected works through new electronic technology."'78
Similarly, the advancement of satellite communications has raised
copyright issues which are not squarely addressed by the Copy-
171. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
172. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d
Cir. 1983) (quoting 17 U.S.C § 117 and holding that a computer program, whether in
object or source code, or embedded on a ROM chip, can be protected by copyright).
173. See H.R. REP. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., § 102 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660.
174. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395-96
(1968).
175. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975).
176. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395.
177. Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156; see also discussion of copy-
right objectives supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 157.
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right Act of 1976." 9 Furthermore, the invention of the photocopier
has called the scope of the fair use doctrine into question.80 These
are merely some examples of the copyright questions which tech-
nological developments have presented to the courts. Mediums
created from the combination of scientific advances have also
posed copyright issues.' Recently, the courts have dealt with
definitional issues of digital recordings which also have a video
component."' The courts are now being called upon to adjudicate
copyright law in relation to the Internet.
8 3
In many of these cases the courts are asked to rule on copyright
issues where "the advent of new communications technology has
blurred the distinction between product and process.' 84  Tradition-
ally, copyright law focused on the printing of a book and the copy-
right owner's right to limit access to the work.8 5 There was no
confusion between the product (the book) and the process (the
printing).8 6 Such clear delineation, however, is not apparent where
technology causes product and process to intertwine. 8 7 The treat-
ment of the copyright issues surrounding computer technology
evinces the judiciary's struggle to resolve this quandary.
179. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of Am., Inc., 940
F.2d 1471, 1477 (1 th Cir. 1991), vacated en banc, 949 F.3d 378 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that satellite communications copying involving a significantly different scope).
180. See Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d
1381 (1996) (holding that a copy shop's preparation of course packets was not a fair use).
181. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1996)
(finding that digital CD medium with video output capability is not within statutory defi-
nition of "phonorecord").
182. See id.
183. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907
F.Supp. 1361, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that online service provider could not be
held liable for direct copyright infringement); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld,
Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1171, 1178 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (imposing infringement damages for di-
rect liability on website operator).
184. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of Am., Inc., 940
F.2d 1471, 1478 (1 lth Cir. 1991), vacated en banc, 949 F.3d 378 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
185. See id.; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
186. See Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services, 940 F.2d at 1477.
187. See id.
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B. Computers and Copyright: The Court's Call
The courts have assumed the primary responsibility for recon-
ciling copyright law with computer technology, as Congress has
not clearly legislated the line between computer product and proc-
ess.'88 The courts have therefore been charged with establishing,
through case law, the elements of computer technology which are
subject to copyright.'89
1. Computer Basics
"As scientific knowledge advances, courts endeavor to keep
pace, and sometimes, as in the area of computer technology, they
are required to venture into less than familiar waters.' " 90 In such
instances, it is essential for the courts to obtain a basic under-
standing of the technology before adjudicating its relationship to
copyright law.' 9' Likewise, general knowledge of the computer
realm is necessary to comprehend the law established by the
courts.
A computer is a "sophisticated electronic machine," which em-
ploys programs to manipulate data.'92 "A 'computer program' is a
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in
a computer to bring about a certain result."' 93 Programs are divided
into two main categories; 94 operating systems programs, also
known as firmware, 195 and application programs, also known as
software. 196 Operating systems programs run the computer's inter-
nal functions and facilitate the use of applications programs.' 97
"Applications programs usually perform a specific task for the
188. See Velasco, supra note 50, at 292 n3.
189. Id.
190. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Atlai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
191. See id.
192. See Velasco, supra note 50, at 244.
193. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
194. See DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY, supra note 26.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 643 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
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computer user such as word processing."' 98 The information stor-
age areas of the computer are Read Only Memory ("ROM") and
Random Access Memory ("RAM"). 99 Generally, the information
in ROM, as its name implies, can only be read, not erased or re-
written.200 In contrast, RAM may be read, re-written, and erased.2 °'
The instructions contained on a computer program must be in a
"language" which the computer can "understand. 20 2 This binary
language, composed of zeroes and ones, is known as object code. 3
Most programs, however, are initially written in source code and
then translated into object code.2° Source code is comprehensible
by humans, whereas object code is generally readable only by ma-
chines.
2. The Judicial Nexus
The courts have determined that a computer program is a "lit-
erary work" which Congress intended to afford copyright protec-
tion.2 6 Programs that can be deciphered by humans, as well as
programs which can only be read by machines, are within the
scope of copyright. 207 Thus, programs written in either source or
object code are protectable modes of expression.0 8 Moreover, the
courts have determined that application programs and operating
system programs are copyrightable works.
Copyright protection extends to programs written onto disk as









206. See Tandy Corp.'v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173
(D.Cal. 1981).
207. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247
(3d Cir. 1983); see also Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982).
208. See id.
209. See Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251-1252.
210. See Tandy, 524 F.Supp. at 173.
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ums allow the work to be "fixed 1' in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. Similarly, the courts have held that interactive programs,
whose sequence of action is altered by each user, nevertheless,
meets the Copyright Act's fixation requirement. 213  Furthermore,
the loading of a computer program into RAM creates a copyrighted
work. 14  This act creates a copy as the "representation created in
RAM is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than tran-
sitory duration.,
215
The judiciary's resolution of these issues established that a
computer program's literal elements, or "aspects which can be re-
duced to written code," are copyrightable. 6 Most litigated dis-
putes, however, have centered on the copyrightability of the non-
literal elements of computer works.2 7 The plaintiffs in these cases
allege that "the 'look and feel' of a program (but not necessarily
the literal code) have been copied. 2  The courts, utilizing a vari-
ety of tests to determine whether the programs are substantially
similar, have held to varying degrees that copyright protection may
extend beyond literal elements. 2 9 The application of these various
211. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a work as ."fixed' in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C.A. §
101.
212. See Tandy, 524 F.Supp. at 173.
213. See Williams Electronics, 685 F.2d at 874; Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888
F.2d 878, 884n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
214. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993);
see also case study, infra pp. 29-31.
215. See id.; see also definition of "fixed" supra note 211.
216. Ballon, supra note 81, at 89.
217. See Oman, supra note 20, at 8.
218. Ballon, supra note 81, at 89. "Judge Learned Hand noted, 'it is of course es-
sential to any protection of literary property... that the right cannot be limited literally to
the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations."' Bateman v. Mnemon-
ics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1544 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Nichols v. Universal, 45 F.2d at
121).
219. The primary tests for substantial similarity applied by the courts are the Whe-
lan test, see generally Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 797 F.2d
1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing test for substantial similarity in computer program
cases); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992) (Extrin-
sic-Intrinsic test); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992)
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tests have lead to inconsistent results, thus the law in this area re-
mains uncertain.
Both literal and non-literal elements will be denied copyright
where they are composed of "[flunctional or minimally creative
portions of programs.,,2' ° For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to afford copyright protection to the "constants
2
'
which constituted part of a formula used to perform calculations.2
The Court held that constants are not copyrightable, because as
elements which exist in nature they are not created, but rather, they
are "merely observed, discovered and recorded. 223  The circuit
courts, however, are not always in agreement as to what constitutes
functional elements.2 4 For example, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
an input/output formula, consisting of a series of words and a
framework of instructions designed to prompt the entering of data
was copyrightable because other formulas existed which achieved
the same result.225 In contrast, the First Circuit held that a menu
command's structure was an unprotectable method of operation re-
gardless of the fact that other structure sequences and words could
have been employed to perform the same function. 6 The Fifth
Circuit's ruling that creativity may transform a functional element
of a program into protectable expression 27 cannot be reconciled
with the First Circuit's determination that "[t]he fact that there may
be many different ways to operate a computer program.., does
not make the actual method of operation chosen copyrightable.,
221
This conflict demonstrates the lack of consensus which persists
in regard to the copyrightability of some elements of computer
programs. The rulings which have been handed down by specific
(the Abstraction-Filtration test).
220. Ballon supra note 81, at 87.
221. "Constants are invariable integers." Id. at 88.
222. See id.
223. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 842-43 (10th Cir.
1993).
224. See Ballon supra note 81, at 87.
225. See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335,
1343-1346 (1994) modified and reh'g denied, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995).
226. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995).
227. See Engineering Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1343-1346.
228. Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d at 818.
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Circuits may guide a determination of copyrightability, but until a
majority of the courts adopt the holding, the issue cannot be con-
sidered settled.
The copyrightability of screen displays and interfaces falls into
these murky waters.229 Some courts have found that the displays
which are depicted on a computer screen may be separately pro-
tectable as audiovisual works distinct from the copyrightability of
the program's underlying code.230 Such protection, however, will
often be denied for lack of originality where the recording of in-
formation is a screen's primary function.23'
A user interface is the means by which the user interacts with
the program.232 Some courts have held that where a screen display
comprises a user interface, it is subject to the same scrutiny as a
literary work.233 Under this criteria, icons and multiple image dis-
plays or "windows" were considered inseparable from their utility
and were therefore denied copyright protection.'
4
3. Case Study - MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc.
Since copying is an essential element of proving copyright in-
fringement, the definition of "copying" that was applied in MAI
Systems Corp.,235 sets an important precedent in computer copy-
right law.
236
229. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Atlai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir.
1992).
230. See id.
231. In such instances the screen generally appears to be a form which is blank ex-
cept perhaps for a list of common words. See Oman, supra note 20, at 9.
232. See DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY, supra note 26.
233. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir.
1994).
234. See id.
235. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
236. See discussion of copyright infringement supra notes 86-98.
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a. Facts
MAI Systems Corp. ("MAI") designed applications3. and op-
erating system 238 software to run on computers which the corpora-
tion manufactured. 39 In addition, MAI serviced the computers and
operating system software.4 ° Peak Computer, Inc. ("Peak") serv-
iced computer systems, performing both routine maintenance and
emergency repairs.24 1 Among Peak's clients were over one hun-
242dred MAI computer owners. In the course of servicing these
computers it was sometimes necessary for Peak technicians to op-
erate the computer and its operating systems software.243 In addi-
tion, Peak operated multiple MAI computers from Peak's head-
quarters while in possession of a license agreement which
244authorized the use of the program on only one system.
The MAI software license authorized the use of the software by
the licensee for "internal information processing. '245 This license
permitted the customer to load the software into the computer's
RAM,246 creating a working copy of the program. 4' The license
agreement also afforded the customer the right to make one back-
up copy of the program.248 The customer was specifically prohib-
ited from acting in any manner "which might jeopardize MAI's
rights or interests in the [s]oftware. ' '249 Any further "copying" of
the program was among the acts specifically proscribed by the li-
237. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243
(3d Cir. 1983) (discussing applications system programs).
238. See id.





244. See id. at 519.
245. Id. at 517.
246. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243
(3d Cir. 1983) (explaining RAM).
247. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 n.3 (9th Cir.
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cense agreement."' The software license did "not allow for the use
or copying of MAI software by third parties such as Peak." ''
b. Proceedings
MAI sued Peak for various causes of action,2 including copy-
right infringement. 3 MAI considered Peak's unauthorized use and
maintenance activities to create unlawful copies of MAI's operat-
ing systems program. 4 Peak maintained that its activities did not
constitute copying2 5 as no fixed copy was created. 6  Following
initiation of the suit, a series of preliminary and permanent in-
junctions were issued and appealed,257 as was a partial grant of
summary judgment for MAI. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals consolidated the appeals and decided the merits of the case.259
c. Decision
The Court determined that the loading of an operating system
program from a storage medium into a computer's RAM consti-
tutes copying. 26° The Court found that Peak's actions had created
fixed copies in compliance with the Copyright Act's definitions of
the terms "copies '' :6j and "fixed .' 262 MAI had demonstrated that
250. See id.
251. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,517 (9th Cir. 1993)
252. In addition to copyright infringement, MAI sued Peak for misappropriation of
trade secrets, trademark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition. These
actions were based on Peak's using, maintaining, and allegedly loaning MAI software,
and Peak's employing a former MAI employee. MAI alleged that because of Peak's ac-
tions, MAI lost customers to Peak. Id. at 513.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 517.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 518
257. See id. at 513-515.
258. See id. at 515. (The "district court granted partial summary judgment for MAI
and entered a permanent injunction on the issues of copyright infringement and misap-
propriation of trade secrets").
259. Id. at 516.
260. See id. at 518.
261. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines "copies" as "material objects, other than
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp.
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Peak created a fixed copy of the work "by showing that Peak
load[ed] the software into the RAM and... [was] then able to
view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the com-
puter .... ,,163 The Court, in making its decision, also looked to
case law and CONTU's recommendations 64 for guidance.165 These
sources, although not specifically directed at the issue at hand,266
supported the finding that a fixed copy had been made by Peak. 67




MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc. expanded the scope
of copyright protection afforded to computer programs. 69 This
case held that the simple act of loading a program from a disk into
a computer's RAM creates a copy. 70 No further acts are necessary
to copy the work.271 Copying does not require the replication of the
program onto a disk, stored in permanent memory (ROM), or
272printed out on paper. Therefore, according to this decision, evi-
1999).
262. See definition of "fixed" supra note 211.
263. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,518 (9th Cir. 1993).
264. See discussion of CONTU supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
265. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1996), pt. 1, at 23 and noting that "the placement of a work into a computer is
the preparation of a copy"); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F.Supp 617,
622 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that the loading of a program into RAM creates a tempo-
rary fixation); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988)
("[Tihe act of loading a program from a medium of storage into a computer's memory
creates a copy of the program.").
266. See MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519. The Court commented that, "[wie rec-
ognize that these authorities are somewhat troubling since they do not specify that a copy
is created regardless of whether the software is loaded into RAM, the hard disk, or the
read only memory ('ROM')". Id.
267. See id. The Court noted that the language of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Micro-
soft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1993), while not dispositive, "supports the
view that the copy made in RAM is 'fixed' and qualifies as a copy under the Copyright
Act." Id.
268. See id. at 519.
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dence that a program was loaded into a computer without the copy-
right holder's permission is enough to prove copyright infringe-
ment."3
4. Data Analysis
The copyright issues which stem from the advent of the com-
puter are not easily understood or simply resolved. The sophisti-
cated knowledge required to address this realm has resulted in pre-
cise technological arguments which have changed the face of
copyright law.274 The courts have endeavored to base decisions
about this burgeoning medium upon traditional copyright doctrines
and policy."7 Most would agree that their efforts have been suc-
cessful.276  Certainly, copyright protection of computer programs
has "stimulated creativity, competition, and innovation, and has
suppressed piracy and predatory commercial practices. '  Thus, it
seems that the judiciary has succeeded in furthering the primary
goal of copyright policy; progress."'
III. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF HOLOGRAPHIC STORAGE MEDIUMS
This Part examines the potential application of copyright in-
formation recorded as holographs. This technology is still in a
very early stage of development, thus the predictions made herein
are fairly speculative. The fundamental properties of this me-
dium,279 however, are known, and when viewed in light of the
copyrightability of other aspects of advanced modes of expres-
sion, it is possible to draw conclusions about the elements of
holographic technology.
Comparisons to a court's treatment of technological mediums
273. See id. at 517.
274. See Oman, supra note 20, at 8, 13.
275. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Atlai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir.
1992).
276. See Oman, supra note 20, at 8, 13.
277. Id.
278. See discussion of the objectives of copyright law notes 48-57 and accompany-
ing text.
279. See discussion of holographic storage supra notes 6-42 and accompanying text.
280. See discussion of technological advancements and .copyright law supra Part
II.A. notes 153-187.
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created in conjunction with the computer are especially useful.
Holographic data storage is likely to be used with already existing
computer technology.28' Thus, the law in this realm is inclined to
offer effective guidance in the assessment of holography's relation
to copyright. This is especially true of a medium, presently in ex-
istence, which is derived from digital storage and holographic
technology.282 "Digital holographic storage" exemplifies both the
technological possibilities of the holographic medium as well as
the legal implications for works stored by such means.283
A. Process is Never Copyrightable
Holographic data storage is accomplished by using lasers to
encode284 a large block of data285 onto a lithium niobate286 crystal.
287
Since, copyright law explicitly denies protection to processes or
methods of operation, the means by which data is stored as holo-
grams can not be copyrighted.288 However, this scientific ad-
vancement is the proper subject of patent law.289.
281. See Brett Mendel, Infrastructure Data Storage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at
84.
282. See Digital Holographic Data Storage Looks Ahead, PHOTONICS SPECTRA,
Mar. 1, 1996 at 44.
283. Physicians Report that Digital Holography Aids Diagnosis and Treatment Of
Complex Spinal and Head and Neck Conditions, BUSINESS WIRE, May 19, 1997, avail-
able in Westlaw, BUSWIRE database.
284. See Scott supra note 34, at 526.
285. See Tom Thompson, When Silicon Hits Its Limits, What's Next? A Glimpse At
Three Technologies That Could Be The Subsystems Of Tomorrow's Desktop Computers,
BYTE, Apr. 1996 at 44.
286. Lithium niobate crystals are inorganic materials used to store holograms. Sci-
entists are also working on developing polymer materials which offer more flexibility in
their usage. See Technology; Exotic Blends Reveals Strong Optical Gain, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Aug. 1997 at 35.
287. A crystal is "a clear, transparent mineral that looks like ice, especially the
transparent or nearly transparent form of pure quartz." WORLDBOOK MULTIMEDIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA (1997).
288. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 1999); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 103 (1879) (holding that expression of a bookkeeping system was not copyrightable);
see also supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 40 discussing patent law. Holographic storage is a patented
invention which is detailed in U.S. Patent 5,665,493. See also Dopants: Pr+3 Ions Im-
prove Storage Media, OPTICAL MATERIALS & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 8957143.
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Further, the crystal medium currently utilized as storage area is
not copyrightable because it is not an original work.2'9 The crystal
is not a new invention, rather it exists in nature.29' Therefore, the
crystal is not patentable.2 92 Other, man-made storage mediums are
currently being developed which might qualify for patent protec-
tion.2 93 These substances, however, would be unlikely to be
granted copyright protection because, like a computer disk, they
294
are utilitarian in nature, not creative.
B. Computer Programs Stored as Holographic Data are
Copyrightable
1. Holographic Works Are Fixed
The Copyright Act of 1976 mandates that copyright may ex-
tend only to original works "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. ' ' Much of the early debate regarding the copyrightability of
computer programs centered on the extent to which that medium
complied with this fixation requirement. 96
Computer programs are classified as literary works297 which the
Copyright Act specifically provides may be expressed in disk
form.29 ' This medium stores data in the form of magnetic patterns
on its surface.2 99 The courts have resolved that computer programs
are also copyrightable when they are embodied in silicon chips.3°°
This medium, which is mounted within the computer structure,
uses switches which hold data and respond to changes in electric
current to communicate the program's directions to the com-
290. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 1999).
291. See supra note 287 for a definition of crystal.
292. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
293. See Mendel, supra note 281, at 84.
294. See supra notes 220-234 and accompanying text for discussion of functional
elements of computer programs.
295. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 1999); see also supra notes 73-77 and accom-
panying text.
296. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993);
see also supra Part II.B.3 for discussion of fixation.
297. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying case.
298. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999).
299. See DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY, supra note 26.
300. See supra notes 210-215 and accompanying text.
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puter.30 ' The courts have ruled that so long as the expression of the
program may be perceived for a period of more than transitory du-
ration, either by humans or by machine, it meets the fixation re-
quirement. °2 One case, discussing the legislative history of the
Copyright Act, stated that the definition of "fixed" embodies all
"form[s], manner[s] or medium[s] of fixation."3 °3
Holographic data storage is a creative medium which meets the
statutory definition304 of fixation .305 This medium provides many
technological advantages over other storage mediums3° while ren-
dering the data as retrievable as any storage medium currently con-
sidered copyrightable.3 7
Computer data which is read and recorded by laser beams301 is
301. See DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY, supra note 26.
302. See supra Part II.B.3; Tandy Corp. v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171, 171 (D.Cal. 1981); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983).
303. Tandy, 524 F.Supp. at 173 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) at 52). The court stated:
If any doubt is left by the wording of the statute, the legislative history makes
clear the all-inclusive nature of the definition of 'fixed' form. Under the bill it
makes no difference what the form, manner or medium of fixation may be -
whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or
symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or other stable form, and whether
it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device 'now
known or later developed.
Id.
304. See supra note 211 for definition of "fixed".
305. See supra Part II.B.3.
306. See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text for discussion of holographic
storage advantages.
307. See discussion of copyrightable mediums supra notes 210-234 and accompa-
nying text
308. A ribbon cord connected to a PC board allows data to be downloaded from a
computer to a spatial light modulator. Here the data is turned into code which can be
used to create an interference pattern within a crystal. As the information enters the spa-
tial light modulator from the computer the PC board translates the data into video rasters.
The contents of the computer's memory are then represented by on and off blocks of
grouped pixels. The blocks are encoded so that a pair of blocks coded dark/bright repre-
sent a "0," while the pairs of blocks encoded bright/dark represent a "1." The on blocks
are opaque and thus block or deflect light from passing through. Light easily passes
through the transparent off blocks. Interference is created when the signal beam passes
through the encoded data and collides with a reference beam inside a crystal. The inter-
ference pattern changes the crystal's molecular structure and this results in the recording
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distributed and holographically stored throughout the "volume" of
a sugar-cube sized medium,3°9 while digital and magnetic storage
use only the surface of the medium to store data.10 This enables
much more data to be stored as holograms than by other means. "
Retrieval of data stored in holographic form is basically accom-
plished by reversing the process by which it was stored . 2  Re-
called data, whether stored by conventional methods or
holographically, is perceivable with the aid of a computer for an
unlimited duration.3 Experts predict that as holographic technol-
ogy advances, the stored data will be retrievable at a much faster
pace than that of current storage technologies.
1 4
The stored information will also be permanently available." 5
While it will be possible to erase holographically stored data,316 it
will not be possible to do so accidentally.3"7
"Glitches" that oftentimes wreak havoc upon the data stored
with today's computer technology will not negatively impact
holographically stored data.3"8 The recordation of data throughout
the whole crystal not only dramatically increases the amount of
storage area, but also serves to make its retrieval very reliable. 9
Holographically stored information exists as wave interference
of the data in the form of that pattern. See Scott, supra note 34, at 62.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text for discussion of multiplexing.
312. To play back recorded data the signal beam is shut off and the reference beam
is tilted to the same angle it used to store the data. The crystal naturally refracts the ref-
erence beam and the image is captured by a CCD. A CCD is "a charge coupled de-
vice... [composed of] ... a light sensitive array of photodiodes linked to capacitors that
store charges when its electrical field is disturbed by incoming photons." The data pro-
duced here is used to reconstruct the original page of memory from the spatial light
modulator. Scott, supra note 34, at 62.
313. "Ideally, optical computers should be able to perform as general-purpose ma-
chines, substituting directly for electronic counterparts." Eric J. Lerner, Optical Com-
puting Promises High Speed and Bandwidth, LASER Focus WORLD, Oct. 1, 1997.
314. See Mendel, supra note 281, at 84.
315. See Stone, supra note 9, at 182.
316. See Scott, supra note 34, at 62.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See Creating Holographic Storage, BYTE, Apr. 1996, at 48.
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patterns 2, which means it exists redundantly throughout the me-
dium.3 ' "While a defect in the medium for disk or tape storage
might garble critical data, a defect in a holographic medium
doesn't wipe out information." '322 Interruptions will only serve to
"dim" the holographic imprint323 or split the hologram, creating a
duplication of the original hologram.324 No information will be
lost. However, as frustrated users can attest, this may occur when
a problem arises with conventional storage techniques.325
Holographically stored data can be put to the same functions as
any other data storage medium.326 A computer program stored as a
hologram would impart the same information to a computer as any
medium presently deemed copyrightable. 327 Thus, the results of the
program's direction would be the same as results achieved by con-
ventional mediums upon which programs are currently ex-
pressed.328
The properties of holographic data storage systems plainly
permit data to be "fixed in a tangible medium of expression."3 9
The ruling in MAI Systems Corp. illustrates that copyrighted com-
puter programs are protected against the making of unlawful cop-
ies, no matter what medium those copies embody.330 Whenever the
expression of the program is communicated for a stable period of
time, a fixed copy of the work is created.13' Here, the reliable na-
ture of this medium, as well as its fast recall capacity render holo-
graphic data "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
320. See supra notes 308 and 312 and accompanying text discussing the holo-
graphic storage process.
321. See Stone, supra note 9, at 182.
322. See supra note 319.
323. See id.
324. See Stone, supra note 9, at 182.
325. See id.
326. See Lerner, supra note 313.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See discussion of statutory copyright criteria supra notes 72-93 and accompa-
nying text.
330. See supra notes 260-268 and accompanying text.
331. See id.
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more than transitory duration." '332 Therefore, holographic works
meet the statutory requirement of fixation.333
2. Holographic Works Are Copyrightable
An original computer program fixed in a holographic medium
complies with the statutory criteria for copyrightable works.334 The
copyrightability of a holographically expressed computer program
is not precluded by the inability of the human eye, alone, to deci-
pher the data stored within the medium.335 Federal statute provides
that a work may qualify for copyright protection even where it is
communicated with the aid of a machine.336 The courts have ruled
that this protection extends to computer programs which are exclu-
sively machine readable.337 Computer programs stored in holo-
graphic form are thus copyrightable, and should be subject to the
same rules of copyright which the courts have previously applied
to such works.33
The copyrightability of computer programs, their non-literal
elements, screen displays, interfaces, and the like, should not be
impacted by their fixation in a holographic medium.339 The prior
rulings of the courts regarding these works are applicable, because
the change in medium does not change the properties of the works
upon which the decisions rested.3 4' The underlying works remain
the same; they are simply stored differently.
Furthermore, copyrighted works recorded as holograms will
not lose their copyright status by being transferred to this medium,
nor will the exclusive rights of the copyright holder be effected. 4'
332. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
333. See id.
334. See discussion of statutory copyright criteria supra notes 72-77 and accompa-
nying text.
335. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248
(3d Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
336. See discussion of statutory copyright criteria 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (b) (West
Supp. 1999).
337. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
338. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
339. See id.
340. See supra discussion Part II.B.2.
341. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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"That a work is transferred into a different medium is not itself a
bar to recovery." 32 This transference from one tangible medium of
expression to another constitutes the making of a copy.43 Thus, the
holographic recording of a copyrighted work without the copyright
holder's permission, is an act of infringement upon the copyright.
4
Moreover, the holographic recording of a copyrighted work, even
if permitted by the copyright holder, affords no copyrights to the
recorder of the work, or compilation, unless the manner in which
the preexisting works are arranged constitutes an original expres-
sion4 '
3. All Original Holographic Works Qualify
Copyright protection of the holgraphic medium clearly furthers
the promotion of progress in the arts and sciences. The federal
copyright statute, as it has been interpreted by the courts, encom-
passes all holographically stored original works no matter what
their categorical classification. The fixation requirement, as previ-
ously noted, is clearly met by this medium.3" Therefore, any
original work fixed by these means qualifies for protection against
copyright infringement.347
348The potential uses of holographic storage are numerous.
Technological innovations in the medium could possibly enable
the holographic storage of audio recordings, the creation of 3-D
motion pictures and television, as well as the development of inter-
active board games. Any original work which is fixed in this type
of medium, or any other which holographic storage makes possi-
ble, is copyrightable.? 9 This medium's compliance with statutory
requirements mandates its copyrightability. 30 Denial of copyright
342. Atari v. Philips, 672 F.2d at 618n.12 (holding that a preliminary injunction
should issue where substantial similarity of two computer game characters is demon-
strated, citing Universal, 162 F.2d at 360).
:343. See supra Part II.B.3.
344. See id.
345. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
346. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
347. See discussion of copyright criteria supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
349. See discussion supra notes 38-47.
350. See discussion supra notes 48-60.
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protection thus, flouts Constitutional aims and impairs progress."'
Copyright law, in furtherance of the public good, ensures that
useful knowledge and ideas are disseminated amongst society.352
The basis of copyright law is to encourage authors' creativity while
at the same time disseminating vital information to the public.5 3
The primary purpose of copyright law is not to benefit the creator
of a work.3- Rather, the Supreme Court has determined that the
"'sole interest of the United States and the primary object in con-
ferring the [copyright] monopoly' ... 'lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors." 355
The development of holographic storage is inherently benefi-
cial to societal growth. The types of works which can be fixed in
this medium are by no means limited to the entertainment field.356
Works which have the capacity to benefit society in the fields of
medicine, science, research, etc., may also be made possible by
development of this medium.357 However, if the works stored
within this medium are not afforded copyright protection it is un-
likely that authors will expend their creative energies.3 ' The courts
have the difficult job of balancing the public's access to new inno-
vation while at the same time protecting innovator's rights to their
351. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
352. "The very object of publishing a book.., is to communicate to the world the
useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge
could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book." Cable News Net-
work, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1479n.14 (11 th
Cir. 1991), vacated' en banc, 949 F.3d 378 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citing Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S: 340, 340 (1991)' (quoting Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879)).
353. See Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services, 940 F.2d at 1478; see
also L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5
(1987). "Copyright's basis as a proprietary concept is that it enables one to protect his or
her own creations. Its regulatory basis is that when these creations constitute the expres-
sion of ideas presented to the public, they become part of the stream of information
whose unimpeded flow is critical to a free society." Cable News Network v. Video Moni-
toring Services, 940 F.2d at 1478.
354. See Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. at 432 (1984).
355. Id. at 432 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
356. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 352-355 and accompanying text.
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labors so that they continue to create new works.359
CONCLUSION
New Strides in technology are important to the continued
growth of this nation. The Founding Fathers implicitly recognized
this truth, and codified it into our social contract; the United States
Constitution. Congress, and the courts have tried to fulfill the goal
of forward progression by their treatment of copyright. In the case
of holographic data storage, no new amendments to the Copyright
Act of 1976 need to be passed to afford this medium copyright
protection. Holographic works clearly fit within the scope of
copyright. This technology of the near future is likely to have a
great impact upon society. Copyright laws have been passed to
promote just this type of advancement. Every consideration leads
to the conclusion that holographic data storage is a copyrightable
medium which will compel society to flourish with the creation of
works which have yet to be imagined.
359. See id. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156-
57 (1975). The Court stated:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly.., reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest. Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.
Id. (Footnotes omitted.). Further, "the line must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in
consideration 'the preservation of the balance between competition and protection re-
flected in the patent and copyright laws."' Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kulpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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